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FAULT LINES OF GLOBALIZATION: LEGAL ORDER AND THE 
POLITICS OF A-LEGALITY, by Hans Lindhal1
IN FAULT LINES OF GLOBALIZATION: Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality, 
Hans Lindhal develops a conceptual framework for transnational legal theory, 
which is grounded in the notion that our modes of reasoning about law must 
extend beyond the state-centered model by taking into account the diverse ways 
in which legal orders relate to one another. 
In the introduction, Lindhal notes the preoccupation of many theorists to 
develop accounts of law that can accommodate the emergence of non-state legal 
systems.2 In characterizing legal systems by reference to how they relate to the 
state-centered model (either adhering to it or transcending it), this tendency 
tacitly confirms the centrality of the territorial state as the source of legal order. 
Instead, Lindhal suggests the language of boundaries, limits, and fault lines. 
In so far as a legal order derives its identity by distinguishing itself from other 
legal orders, it is necessarily limited. A legal system’s limits are exposed when it is 
faced with an a-legal act that is not orderable, or impossible to establish as either 
legal or illegal. In such cases, a legal order’s boundaries emerge as fault-lines, 
which raise normative questions regarding what actions a legal system can (or 
should) account for, and how it should adapt to a-legality.3 
The book is divided into two parts, which are meant to illustrate the 
ideological progression of Lindhal’s theory. Part one delves into Lindhal’s 
conceptual framework, closely analyzing each of boundaries, limits, fault-lines, 
and a-legality in turn. After discussing the work of Hans Kelsen and Ronald 
Dworkin, the first chapter illustrates the core tenets of a legal order through 
1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 304 pages.
2. Ibid at 2. 
3. Ibid at 4. 
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the use of fictional scenarios. The second chapter tests Lindhal’s claim that a 
legal order must possess a “limited distribution of ought-places” by considering 
“a panoply of legal orders that are irreducible to state law,” such as lex mercatoria 
or the law of cyberspace.4 In doing so, Lindhal illustrates that while a legal order 
need not be limited to the territorial state, it must be limited in some respect, 
that is, it must involve “a closure whereby an inside is preferred to an outside.”5 
The third chapter expounds the importance of the “first-person plural 
concept of legal order.”6 Lindhal uses an aggregative “we” (a group of individuals 
who view themselves as a unit) to describe the communities that make up legal 
orders. The aggregative “we” is important, for it underscores the necessity of 
boundaries by drawing attention to the fact that any collective derives its identity 
via its distinction from other communities. 
The second part of the book moves from exposition to application, illustrating 
how boundaries, limits, and fault-lines are redrawn. The fourth chapter opens 
part two by focusing on the process of legal ordering itself. The intentionality 
behind designating an action as legally significant (that is, as either legal or 
illegal) illustrates the origin of the a-legal: an action which is not contemplated 
and, consequently, is neither included nor excluded by a legal system.7 
The fifth chapter continues and develops the discussion of the a-legal. 
The key distinction drawn in this chapter is between a-legality and not-yet-(il)
legality. The purpose of such distinction is to characterize that a-legal acts are not 
orderable by a legal system, as opposed to simply not yet ordered. To facilitate 
further conceptual analysis of a-legality, Lindhal divides it into weak and strong 
dimensions. These concepts are developed further in chapter six, where Lindhal 
focuses on the process of boundary-drawing, examined through the lens of 
collective self-identification. 
While the first six chapters of Lindhal’s book sketched out a descriptive 
account of how boundaries, limits, fault lines, and a-legality interact, the final 
chapter turns to the normative questions arising therefrom, such as the question 
of how to respond to a-legality. Lindhal undertakes such discussion through the 
lens of reciprocity, a concept that appears in both particularist and universalist 
accounts, both of which seek to articulate joint action so as to render it agreeable 
to all parties involved.8 In doing so, however, such approaches fixate on unity 
4. Ibid at 44. 
5. Ibid at 76. 
6. Ibid at 81.
7. Ibid at 152-54. 
8. Ibid at 233.
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rather than plurality. Lindhal refers to this as a reciprocity-driven politics of 
boundary-setting, a tendency which he resists. Instead, he suggests that legal 
collectives embrace self-restraint: an obligation to acknowledge that which 
cannot be integrated within a given community’s legal boundaries.9 
The book ends with a brief conclusion, which summarizes its main ideas 
and underscores Lindhal’s intention to develop the normative implications of his 
conceptual framework in later research. Though it would have been a pleasure 
to see further discussion of the normative consequences of his account in the 
present publication, this does not detract from the strengths of Fault Lines, which 
are many. Lindhal’s achievement in developing a unique theory of global law, 
and contributing a new perspective to an otherwise saturated academic debate, 
cannot be understated. 
9. Ibid at 249.

